



Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)

Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90

INTERIM JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-90

CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC)

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PREFACE

1. **Background.** Work underway within the UN, NATO and the EU with respect to Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is at various stages of development and agreement. MOD Policy for CIMIC was agreed by Chiefs of Staff in February 2003 and this IJWP provides detailed guidance for the conduct of CIMIC from the UK perspective, coherent with that policy.
2. **Purpose.** The purpose of IJWP 3-90 is to articulate the UK military approach to CIMIC from concept to practice. It will fill the current void in detailed national guidance for CIMIC, as well as underpinning the UK input to the further development of multinational CIMIC doctrine. Its utility will be reviewed in the light of NATO CIMIC doctrine development. It is intended that a CIMIC handbook will be published to supplement guidance within this IJWP: this will address the tactical level in particular.
3. **Context.** The principles of CIMIC apply across the entire spectrum of tension and in varying degrees to all UK Defence Missions. While the principles of CIMIC are applicable at each level of war and command, this IJWP is focused at the operational level; the Joint Task Force Commander and his staff being the focus for ensuring the necessary coherence of CIMIC in the Joint Operations Area.
4. **Structure.** This IJWP is structured to provide an understanding of CIMIC from the UK perspective, its applicability across the spectrum of tension, and the environment within which it will be conducted. The first half describes concepts and principles, the second half gives more detail on planning and conduct.

LINKAGES

5. This IJWP takes account of NATO CIMIC Policy (MC 411/1), UK Defence Policy for CIMIC and AJP-9 '*NATO CIMIC Doctrine*'. It amplifies the basic tenets of CIMIC put forward in JWP 0-10 '*United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations*' (UKOPSDOC) and JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Doctrine*'.¹ It should be read in conjunction with JWP 3-50 '*Peace Support Operations Doctrine*', JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*' and JWP 3-52 '*Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations Doctrine*' (HDRO) when involved in those particular operations.

¹ JWP 0-10 is due to be replaced by JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' and JWP 3-00 (Original) will be replaced by JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' in April 2004.

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CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

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JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of JWPs.

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in DCI JS 91/2003.

CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW

‘Pursuing (Britain’s security priorities) requires the combined application of all means at our disposal. Military action is one of those means but will seldom be sufficient on its own. We require armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and developmental levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict as well as conducting effective military operations if required.’¹

101. During the Cold War and its ‘static’ focus on the NATO area, any requirement for civil-military interaction became institutionalised by formal Host-nation support (HNS) standing agreements. The post-Cold war security environment has been characterised by an increase in intra-state conflict, combined with an increased readiness to intervene. This environment, with a proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs) together with increased media influence, presents considerably more complex challenges to operations, all of which are found to have a critical civil-military dimension. The interaction within the civil-military dimension of operations is termed Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). CIMIC is a command responsibility, and a process that is command led.

SECTION I – THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

102. **A Multi-Dimensional Environment.** The present operational environment is likely to be complex, unstable and unpredictable. Military success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors² are created. In the majority of operations, intolerance to collateral damage (both in terms of casualties and materiel), damage to the environment and legal issues will all be constraining factors in the conduct of operations. As a consequence, military operations now take place within a wider political and civil context than hitherto, and commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting those operations. The scale and nature of the risks and challenges within this multinational, multi-agency environment requires greater understanding of and emphasis on CIMIC at all levels of operation.

103. **Multi-Functional Response.** The civil actors addressing the conditions and circumstances of any given conflict or crisis situation will have varying mandates, competencies and capacities. The complex dynamics and inter-relationships of these actors will blur boundaries. All actors, both military and civil, involved in an area of

¹ SDR Chapter 2 paragraph 43.

² The term ‘civil actors’ may be taken to include IOs, donor organisations (e.g. International Monetary Fund (IMF)), other security forces (e.g. civil police), NGOs, the corporate sector, national and local authorities, and local populations.

operations will have an influence on those operations and so will create an effect, both on the operational environment and on the activities of the other involved actors.

104. **Integration and Disengagement.** Depending on the type of operation, the successful harmonisation of military efforts with those of other actors will enable increased coherence and synergy in generating the overall effects required to address the conflict or crisis situation. Successful harmonisation will also enable the commander to achieve greater effectiveness in contributing to the accomplishment of the desired overall strategic outcome, in a shorter time-scale, with the potential to reduce overall resource expenditure. CIMIC is the process by which this harmonisation can be achieved, the level of which will vary, and depend on the specific operational circumstances.

SECTION II – THE APPROACH TO CIMIC

105. **Definition.** The NATO definition of CIMIC focuses on the military mission:

‘The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies’.

106. **UN Definition.** The UN refers to Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCoord) as ‘the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors...to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize conflict, and when appropriate pursue common goals’.³

107. **US Model.** The US does not use the term CIMIC, but defines Civil Affairs (CA) activities as those that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present, to enhance the conduct of civil military operations. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are those activities that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civilian agencies in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional or national government, and may occur in the absence of other military operations.⁴ Experience has shown that the US will deploy a separate CA command that retains its own structure and command and control across the force.

³ ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’ dated March 2003.

⁴ US Joint Pub 1-02 amended August 2002.

108. **UK Approach.** Although the UK accepts the NATO definition, the UK approach, (as articulated in UK CIMIC Policy⁵ and agreed by Chiefs of Staff in February 2003), is to ‘view CIMIC⁶ in the context of enabling military operations to make a more coherent contribution to the achievement of UK and international political objectives’. The UK does this by fully integrating CIMIC staff, and the CIMIC process, into the chain of command. This is fundamentally different to the approach of some other nations, notably the US.

SECTION III – THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

109. **Purpose.** CIMIC is a function of operations conducted to allow the commander to interact effectively with all parts of the civil environment within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). It provides the interface for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange at all levels between military forces, civilian organisations, agencies, and in-theatre civil influences both to assist the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with the successful completion of the mission, and to maximise the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission. Where effective CIMIC results in the release of military resources for other operational tasks, it can be a force multiplier.

110. **Applicability.** CIMIC is applicable throughout the full spectrum of tension, and in all phases of conflict it assists in shaping the operational environment to the mutual benefit of both military and civil actors. The process of harmonising civil and military planning should begin at the highest political levels, and commanders should consider the CIMIC dimension of the operation from the outset of the planning process; it should be integrated into the campaign plan, and it should remain coherent throughout the operational and tactical levels.

111. **Utility.** The purpose of CIMIC is achieved through a number of activities whose utility is as follows:

- a. **Setting Conditions for Success.** CIMIC will contribute to establishing and maintaining the co-operation of the civil population and agencies within the JOA in order to create conditions that offer increased likelihood of mission success.
- b. **Provision of a Civil-Military Interface.** Management of the civil-military interface enables identification of means to influence the attitudes and conduct of civil agencies and populations in order to maximise support to

⁵ D/JDCC/20/8/1 dated 6 February 2003.

⁶ CIMIC can be taken to include those aspects of an operation which were previously termed Civil Affairs by the UK.

operations, minimise interference, project mission legitimacy and enhance force protection within the JOA.

c. **Fulfilment of Legal Obligations.** CIMIC contributes to the JTFC's fulfilment of his responsibilities under international laws.

112. **Functions.** CIMIC requires the following core functions:

a. **Liaison Between Military and Civil Agencies.** Military liaison with civil agencies provides the basis from which the other two core functions develop. Military liaison with civil agencies provides fundamental input to the military estimate and planning process, and will always be conducted in support of the military mission. Establishing liaison and civil-military planning mechanisms at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is a pre-condition of success.

b. **Support to the Force.** In circumstances where there is no competent authority through which to facilitate host or foreign nation support, the resources, supplies, infrastructure and expertise of the indigenous civil community and/or international agencies will be necessary to support of the military mission. CIMIC will also be essential in maintaining the JTFC's freedom of manoeuvre by ensuring that the impact of military operations on the civil infrastructure, economy and community are minimised and that civilian interference with military operations are, wherever possible, precluded. Such activities represent support to the force.

c. **Support to the Civil Environment.** Military support to the civil community, a civilian organisation or civil authorities in the JOA is referred to as support to the civil environment. Such support can involve a wide range of military resources such as information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. This form of support will generally only take place where and when it is required to create conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the military mission (which may be expanded if necessary to include support to the civil environment), and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task.

CHAPTER 2 – THE CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE

201. Although CIMIC is an essential military element of the Campaign Plan, an understanding of the civil perspective, and the principles associated with that perspective, is key to a successful CIMIC process. This understanding will enable the establishment and maintenance of sound working relationships with organisations in the civil sector. Such relationships range from high-level inter-organisational relations to less formal relations that stem from ongoing working interactions. These relationships will form the bedrock on which effective co-operation can occur.

SECTION I – THE CIVIL CONTEXT

202. **Levels of Co-operation.** It will be neither practicable nor necessary to have the same degree of co-operation with all civil agencies. Many mechanisms and activities will underpin this process. These may include formal or informal liaison and joint or bi-lateral planning or exchanges. The level of command at which CIMIC is conducted will influence the nature of these arrangements.

- a. **Strategic.** This interface is the relationship between military commanders and their national and international political and policy decision-making bodies. Operations by UK forces are conducted in accordance with national political objectives and strategic direction emanates from Cabinet/Ministerial level. This level of activity is primarily the concern of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters and enables the integration of civil strategies into the campaign plan. Such strategic objectives should remain coherent throughout the operational levels and commanders should consider the CIMIC dimension of the operation from the outset of the planning process.
- b. **Operational.** The operational Civil-Military interface describes the relationship between military commanders and national, governmental authorities; active international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and the civilian population of countries within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). CIMIC is required at the operational level to achieve the co-operation necessary to ensure effective planning, preparation, support and execution of operations. This level of CIMIC is the concern of deployed formation HQs at all levels.
- c. **Tactical.** This is the level at which interaction between the military and civilian sectors takes place on the ground. It would be described by the UN and humanitarian sector as the ‘field level’. It is the level at which the CIMIC process, and CIMIC activity, has most immediate effect, these effects can have

implications at the strategic level. CIMIC at the tactical level will be covered more fully in the CIMIC handbook.

SECTION II – CIVIL ORGANISATIONS AND ACTORS

203. Regardless of the type of operation, a complex civil sector will be part of the problem and equally, part of the solution. The military commander will require a clear picture of the civil administration (whether this be sovereign or failed) including such aspects as police, local government, emergency services, utilities etc. The population within an Area of Operations will have its ethnic and religious groupings, cultural differences and allegiances.

204. **Categories of Civil Actors.** The type and degree of co-operation and co-ordination between the military and various civilian organisations will vary depending on the type of civil organisation (and in some cases the particular organisation). Civil organisations are broadly categorised below.

a. **Other Government Departments.** There are a number of other government departments (OGDs) that may become involved in the management of crises. The most critical of these are the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID works with a wide range of implementing partners in the civil sector, and DFID may work with armed forces to facilitate the efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance or to promote a secure environment so that economic, social and political development can take place. DFID can provide, at the request of MOD, a humanitarian advisor to the Joint Task Force Commander.

b. **International Organisations.** IOs are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level such as the various United Nations (UN) organisations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers and co-ordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is more likely to be involved in co-ordinating the activities of relief agencies including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is another influential organisation that may be encountered.

c. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** Separate mention should be made of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which, unlike those IOs mentioned above, was not established by intergovernmental agreement. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation

whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and co-ordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique status as it fulfils a role conferred upon it by international treaties, most notably the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (to which virtually all countries in the world are party), and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

d. **Non-governmental Organisations.** The generic title of NGO encompasses a wide range of organisations with varying mandates, roles and priorities. A large number may already be operating in the crisis region and many will have been there for some time prior to the deployment of military forces. Some may be reluctant to become openly involved with the military and might resist any attempt to co-ordinate their activities. There is, however, some acknowledgement of the need to co-operate, by the exchange of information and the co-ordination of resources, in order to work towards a common purpose. Establishing mechanisms and processes for co-operation during a crisis is essential, and regular peacetime liaison will help the military to understand the various types of NGO and their sensitivities. In some cases NGO umbrella organisations may be established which can provide a degree of coherency. The existence and utility of NGOs is acknowledged in Article 71 of the UN Charter, and they may fall into one of two categories:

(1) **Mandated.** A mandated NGO has been officially recognised by the lead IOs in a conflict or crisis and authorised to work in the affected area.

(2) **Non-Mandated.** A non-mandated NGO has had no official recognition or authorisation and therefore works as a private concern. These organisations could be contracted or sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private enterprises and donors. Examples exist of NGOs that have been created to support one faction in a conflict, often as a means to deliver external support. Contact with such NGOs should be avoided as they may undermine neutrality and obstruct the mission.

e. **Donor Organisations.** Donors may include national donors such as DFID or United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and international donors such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As these

organisations may control much of the funding for developmental activities, they will have an important role in longer term planning. Military links with such organisations will tend to be at higher levels.

f. **The Corporate Sector.** The corporate sector involves multinational business, civil companies and other business interests which might be either already established in the crisis region or become engaged early on in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, whilst military forces are still deployed. Indigenous businesses may be a useful source of information about the local society, as well as playing a critical role in activities such as reintegration of demobilised armed forces into society. Civil companies deployed in response to the crisis may contribute to emergency relief initiatives as well as to longer-term development. Liaison may be required with these various organisations, both for their advice and to ensure co-ordination of activity.

g. **Local Authorities and Populace.** Liaison should be established with the local populace and the recognised authorities within the crisis region, which may not necessarily be the representatives of the Government. (See subparagraph k).

h. **Human Rights and Democratisation Agencies.** The primary agencies in this area are the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, (although the latter only operates within Europe). These agencies seek to protect human rights in states where abuses may be prevalent. They seek to instil democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of government. Additionally, the OSCE has the ability to arrange for and monitor elections, and co-ordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

i. **Civilian Development Agencies.** Some civilian organisations are concerned mainly with reconstruction, rather than relief. Their mandates are to provide technical assistance to developing countries. The UNDP administers and co-ordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies normally spend a longer time in the affected area than the military. In these cases the CIMIC task is to identify the requirement for reconstruction together with the local government, and when possible lead agencies, to enable the organisations to begin work and continue under the most favourable conditions. The reconstruction agencies will usually have allocated resources to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area on the basis of need.

j. **General Population.** The civilian community includes inhabitants within the JOA who hold no formal office, posting or position that identifies them as a representative of a recognised administration or mandated

organisation. In situations that require military engagement, it is quite probable that the civilian population has been involved in a crisis of some kind that has influenced their existing situation and status quo. Such a crisis may be due to human conflict or natural disaster. The crisis may result in civilians leaving their place of residence or nation, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Such people are referred to collectively as dislocated civilians. Specific categories/terminology is used to describe civilians who have been affected in this way. These are:

(1) **Internally Displaced Person.** A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border.¹

(2) **Refugee.** Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.¹

k. **Indigenous Civilian Leaders.** It is critical for commanders to realise that in some instances traditional laws and customs may also apply to civilian communities. In these cases, people other than the official civilian office bearers may exert a system of power and influence. Therefore, within a civilian community there may exist individuals who hold positions of authority and influence in a traditional system that is not easily recognised. As commanders cannot hope to communicate with each and every affected civilian, CIMIC personnel seek instead to communicate with their leaders. Such leaders will be those people in unofficial positions who control community decisions, resources, and influence and guide the opinions and actions of the civilian community.

SECTION III – HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

205. Although CIMIC involves interaction with all sectors of the civilian community, it is the relationship with NGOs and IOs within the humanitarian sector that can be the most demanding. Because it is humanitarian issues which are likely to

¹ AAP-6 'NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions'.

be the most pressing in early phases of an operation, and because these issues are most likely to attract media attention, they merit special attention. Humanitarian issues are covered in full at Annex 2A.

ANNEX 2A – HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

SECTION I – HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

2A1. **Characteristics.** International organisations (IOs) such as United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whether large or small, will be present, each with their own mandate and agenda. CIMIC will inevitably involve working closely with these organisations and it is important that their generic characteristics are understood, including:

- a. **Lack of Uniformity.** There is a definite hierarchy of international IO/NGOs and a sub-strata of minor players with limited resources. The former are sophisticated and better funded organisations whilst the latter are smaller, independent national bodies that often operate in isolation from other agencies.
- b. **Independence.** Agencies are driven by their own agendas. They are usually non-profit making and answerable only to their own directors and donors. They are reluctant to be controlled by other organisations. In most situations they rely on maintaining at least the perception of neutrality and impartiality as a means of promoting their own security and are often reluctant to be associated with the military.
- c. **Longer-Term Commitment.** In contrast to the military, most agencies have longer-term commitments and investments in the countries in which they work and may take a different perspective to the military.

SECTION II – OPERATING PRINCIPLES

2A2. **Legal Basis.** The legal basis for the provision of humanitarian assistance by NGOs will depend upon the nature of the conflict and the existence of a functioning host nation. There is provision within the Geneva Conventions 1949¹ to the effect that impartial humanitarian organisations can operate within a state in which conflict is on-going.

2A3. **Stable and Fragile States.** As a general principle international humanitarian assistance is only provided at the request of, or with the concurrence of, the host nation government. In those situations where a host nation government is still functioning, IOs and NGOs may enter into legal agreements with those governments prior to conducting operations in that country. Such agreements often take the form of official registration with and accountability to a particular government ministry. UN organisations frequently deploy their personnel as ‘UN Experts on Mission’ and are afforded certain privileges and immunities as a result. Many NGOs operate as

¹ GCI, Art 9; GCII, Art 9; GCIII, Art 9 and GCIV, Art 10.

‘implementing’ or ‘operational’ partners of UN agencies, often receiving funding, immunities and protection from the UN.

2A4. Failed or Collapsed States. Where a state ceases to function as a political entity, there exists no national government with which to register. Therefore NGOs can operate on the legal basis of their contracts and agreements with UN agencies or even as independent agencies operating their own programs. This situation may cause difficulties for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), as many of these organisations may not abide by established security agreements and procedures or in accordance with established UN co-ordination structures in theatre. Normally the IO and NGO actors prefer to rely on their impartiality and neutrality for security, however in extremis the IOs and NGOs may seek military protection, which may be critical to their tasks. Under such circumstances they prefer the military to provide area security rather than direct point, location or convoy protection. This ensures the maintenance of ‘humanitarian space’ (see paragraph 2A9).

SECTION III – CO-ORDINATION

2A5. Lead Agency. The UN Secretary General may appoint a lead agency to co-ordinate the activities of all actors participating in a humanitarian operation. If appointed, the Lead Agency is normally a major UN agency such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) or UNICEF. Specific responsibilities of the lead agency are to:

- a. Act as a point of contact for all other actors in the emergency, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.
- b. Co-ordinate field activities to avoid duplication of effort and wasting of resources.
- c. Act as an interface with the military at the theatre level and above, often through the provision of selected liaison officers.

2A6. Resident Co-ordinator and Humanitarian Co-ordinator. If a lead agency is not appointed (increasingly the case), the UN Secretary General will appoint a Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC) to carry out all co-ordination responsibilities. The HC may be the Resident Co-ordinator (the head of the UN country team), or another competent UN official. Either the HC, or his deputy, will almost certainly be a representative of the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which has responsibility for the co-ordination of an international humanitarian response. The HC will draw upon the expertise of the leading UN agencies to advise on sector activities (e.g. UNHCR – refugees, WFP – food and logistics etc.). The RC/HC will also be appointed the Designated Official for Security, and will be

responsible, through the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), for the security and protection of all UN staff and their eligible dependents. The relationship between the JTFC and the RC/HC is critical.

2A7. **Head of Agencies Meeting.** The Head of Agencies Meeting is a key event in the co-ordination process. It is chaired by the HC, lead agency or SRSG, and will include representatives from all the UN agencies, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and NGOs, with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) having observer status. The JTFC should attend.

SECTION IV – HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES

2A8. **Core Humanitarian Principles.** Humanitarian actors need to maintain their independence and freedom of action in order to achieve their own objective of alleviating suffering. Humanitarian assistance by civilian aid organisations is rendered in accordance with 3 principles:²

- a. **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
- b. **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
- c. **Neutrality.** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

2A9. **Humanitarian Space.** A key element for humanitarian agencies and organisations is the establishment and maintenance of a humanitarian operating environment (sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian space’). Maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities effectively and safely, independent of military and political action.

2A10. **Humanitarian Distance.** As a consequence of this perception of the civil-military relationship, and coupled with humanitarian actors’ desire to operate within the bounds of the core humanitarian principles, there is, in the eyes of humanitarian

² UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182.

actors, a requirement to maintain an appropriate Humanitarian Distance from the military in order to maximise ‘humanitarian space’. Humanitarian Distance is not a constant – it will expand and contract depending on the situation and can vary:

- a. With the particular humanitarian actor – their mandate and principles.
- b. With the humanitarian sector within which the actor is working – relative to the spectrum of humanitarian operations – relief to development.
- c. With the level of security within the Joint Operations Area.
- d. With the mission of the Joint Force.
- e. According to the third party perceptions.
- f. With the phase of an operation.
- g. At different levels – tactical to strategic.

2A11. **Information Exchange.** Notwithstanding the need to maintain an appropriate distance, there will be a need for information exchange between the military and humanitarian sectors, with both sides having information that will be of value to the other. The CIMIC process, under the control of the JTFC, should facilitate this exchange of information.

2A12. **Maintaining Boundaries.** Because of the desirability of maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors and that of deployed military forces, the area that causes IOs and NGOs the most concern is their perception of the tendency by militaries to become directly involved in the provision of ‘humanitarian relief’. The provision of a secure environment in which NGOs and IOs can conduct humanitarian operations, and the means by which that environment may be achieved,³ is also a potential source of friction.

2A13. **UN Guidelines.** In the event of military assets being requested or employed in support of UN humanitarian activity, the ‘*Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*’ should be referred to. These guidelines cover the circumstances of both UN (blue beret) and non-UN forces, i.e:

- a. Where humanitarian resources are overwhelmed, and the humanitarian agencies unable or unwilling to provide the necessary assistance, it is accepted by the UN that the direct support of the military may be appropriate as a last resort. In these circumstances the military should act in support of the most appropriate humanitarian agency which will provide the civilian lead, and

³ E.g. Secure sectors, areas or corridors (see paragraph 2A4).

ideally should hand over responsibility as soon as suitable humanitarian resources are available.

b. The routine involvement of military forces in humanitarian activity other than as a last resort is inappropriate, as it may compromise humanitarian principles and therefore put the lives of aid workers at risk, and/or prejudice the success of the humanitarian operation. This does not rule out the use of military assets to provide assistance to the local population, (sometimes described as ‘hearts and minds’ tasks), however this is conducted to achieve military objectives and consequently should not be described as humanitarian. Such assistance should be carried out in liaison with the HC.

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CHAPTER 3 – THE CIMIC PROCESS

SECTION I – CONCEPT

301. CIMIC is an operational enabler and potential force multiplier, mitigating the impact of the civil environment on military operations and vice-versa. The process should be command-led, with early engagement. It enables the commander to undertake in a coherent manner those tasks and activities that flow from the Civil-Military lines of operation in the Campaign Plan.

302. **CIMIC and Civil Actors.** CIMIC as a process is primarily concerned with co-operation with, rather than support or assistance to, civil actors. However, at the practical level, support and assistance may well take place by necessity.

303. **Level of Command.** Whilst Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) driven, CIMIC is applicable to all components, and will have an impact at all levels, including strategic. Commanders at all levels should direct the CIMIC process and any associated tasks and activities carried out by military forces within their area of operation to achieve the necessary unity of command and unity of effort. Whilst each component will have specific individual needs to undertake CIMIC on the ground, a common awareness of the requirements and understanding of the limitations as well as the strengths of CIMIC is fundamental to ensure its common application and to underwrite JTFC theatre-wide coherence.

304. **Aspects of CIMIC.** There are two key aspects to CIMIC, namely Civil-Military Liaison, and those tasks and activities that may need to be undertaken by military forces in support of the civil environment.

a. **Civil-Military Liaison.** This is the key aspect of CIMIC in providing the necessary interaction to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of coherent, and where necessary integrated, activity. Such liaison early in the planning process and throughout the conduct of an operation provides the basis for greater unity of effort and coherence in effect. Whilst liaison is a two-way process, military forces invariably have greater capacity for liaison than civil actors and as such are normally able to take the initiative in establishing liaison mechanisms. In the case of the humanitarian sector consideration may need to be given to conducting this liaison away from formal military establishments in order to preserve the ‘humanitarian space’ (see paragraph 2A9).

b. **Tasks and Activities.** The military may undertake tasks and activities on the Civil-Military Line of Operation of the Campaign Plan, under the commander’s direction and using Joint Force resources and/or local resources facilitated by the Joint Force. A wide range of Joint Forces can be involved: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities,

specialist expertise or training. This activity will clearly have an effect on the civil environment, and will benefit from specialist advice and co-ordination. CIMIC facilitates this advice and co-ordination.

SECTION II – PRINCIPLES GUIDING CIMIC

305. There are 12 key principles that should guide CIMIC:

- Legal Obligations
- Differentiated Relationships
- Cultural Awareness
- Co-operation
- Understanding, Respect and Trust
- Mutual Responsibility
- Transparency
- Communication
- Situational Awareness
- Influence
- Scale of Effort
- Transition Management

306. These principles are covered in more detail below:

a. **Legal Obligations.** Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law. While fulfilling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on and where possible facilitate maximum support for non-combatants. Detailed advice on such obligations can be sought from the Legal Advisor (LEGAD).

b. **Differentiated Relationships.** It will be neither practical nor necessary to have the same degree of co-operation or co-ordination with all civil actors at all times. There are those organisations with whom it is appropriate to conduct specific co-ordinated planning, whereas there may be others with whom it is more appropriate to engage primarily through liaison complemented by co-ordinated training and awareness activities.

c. **Cultural Awareness.** An understanding of civil actor values, customs, ethnicity, religion, culture and ways of life is of fundamental importance on all operations. In a politically sensitive operating environment an unintentional violation of a local law or custom can seriously alter the local perception of the Joint Force and may have implications for the wider international response to a conflict or crisis. Similarly a lack of sensitivity towards the values of an

international organisation (IO) or non-governmental organisation (NGO) could impair effective co-operation and there will be a balance to be struck over the degree of sensitivity required. Indeed, depending on the seriousness, a lack of cultural awareness could potentially undermine mission success. It may also create unfavourable media coverage and could adversely affect support for the operation from within UK.

d. **Co-operation.** CIMIC does not imply either military control of civil actors nor vice-versa. The traditional military concept of command will be alien to many civil actors. Rather, the JTFC will better achieve the necessary civil-military relationships through co-operation, communication, leadership and consensus. Every effort should be made to secure and retain the willing co-operation of civil actors with which the Joint Task Force interacts. Although not all civil actors operating within a Joint Operations Area (JOA) may share the objectives of the Joint Force, it may be possible to identify areas of common ground or at least of mutual interest. In order to reduce friction, and increase the likelihood of achieving a more coherent response to a conflict or crisis situation, these areas should, wherever possible, be identified, acknowledged and recognised. Loss of consensus can occur suddenly, for reasons that may seem trivial, and the JTFC should be prepared to expend time and energy in its pursuit and retention.

e. **Understanding, Respect and Trust.** The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil actors with whom the Joint Force must interact are extremely diverse. As in a multi-national environment, the JTFC and his staff must understand the sensitivities and interests, mandates and methodologies, and competencies, capabilities and capacities of the key civil actors involved within the JOA. This understanding forms the basis of CIMIC. It will enable the JTFC to determine, within the civil-military dimension, what can and cannot be achieved, what will and will not be undertaken, by whom and under what circumstances. Developing respect and trust will take time and effort requiring a broad, coherent and consistent approach. The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs is to establish and maintain relationships before entering an area of operations. This requires joint multi-agency activity within the training regime. Civil agencies can also use such relationships to develop an understanding of how effective liaison with the military can benefit civil goals.

f. **Mutual Responsibility.** The understanding of the civil domain and the identification and recognition of the linkages and interdependence between areas of interest will enable a more inclusive and accommodating environmental and situational analysis. This analysis should lead to agreement on complementary responsibilities and 'lines of demarcation' in order to

establish and maintain durable and mutually beneficial relationships with civil actors. At lower levels, the geographical areas of responsibility for military and civilian organisations will probably not be aligned, and this complication needs to be included in liaison and information sharing arrangements.

g. **Transparency.** Tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times and may be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion, and poor communications. At the civil-military interface, there is a need to demonstrate openness, competence, capability and resolve in order to win the respect, trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment and so engender successful civil-military relationships.

h. **Communication.** Effective communication with civil actors will be vital in applying the foregoing principles; maintaining consent, generating the necessary level of understanding and co-operation. Civil actors with whom the Joint Force will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the Joint Force and their own independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. The positioning of facilities to establish and maintain this requirement needs to be carefully considered. There is a balance to be struck between accessibility for civil actors, force protection and operations security (OPSEC). If placed 'inside the wire' the effectiveness of communication measures may be compromised by the perceptions of civil actors and their need to be, and seen to be, independent, impartial and neutral.

i. **Situational Awareness.** The commander's situational awareness can be improved through CIMIC, and should be informed by the intelligence plan. There is a close relationship between CIMIC and Information Operations. Dialogue with the civil sector should include information sharing; a two-way process. However, just as the JTFC will have concerns over OPSEC, it should be recognised that civil actors will also have information that is sensitive and that they are unable to share. Notwithstanding this, there is much to be gained from information sharing. Every effort should be made to pass timely, relevant and valued information to the appropriate civil actors and not unnecessarily classify information that will not affect OPSEC. The perception that CIMIC is supporting intelligence gathering or propagating disinformation should be guarded against. Information obtained through civil-military relationships and used in support of the force should be used with discretion and the source protected wherever possible.

j. **Influence.** Influence activity comprises any activity whose primary purpose is to influence ‘*Will*’ and can be targeted at any audience capable of affecting the situation whether adversary, friendly or uncommitted.⁴ A subset of influence activity is ‘hearts and minds’ activity. This comprises activities that are targeted at the local population, or at particular groups within it, with the aim of gaining the acceptance (and even support) of the military presence by the targeted audience. This is a key step in enabling the achievement of a safe and secure environment. At the core of a successful ‘hearts and minds’ campaign are activities that lead to a real and demonstrable improvement in the lifestyle of the targeted population. These activities are undertaken to achieve political and military objectives. To generate best effect, they should be properly co-ordinated with the appropriate civil actor. Successful ‘hearts and minds’ activities increase the freedom of manoeuvre of the Joint Force, whilst reducing that of the adversaries. They also enhance the effectiveness of information gathering and contribute to force protection. Because it is not neutral or impartial, ‘Hearts and minds’ activity is not conducted in accordance with ‘humanitarian principles’ (see Annex 2A), and therefore should not be described as humanitarian.

k. **Scale of Effort.** The undertaking of tasks and activities in the civil environment merely to employ spare capacity or generate a ‘feel good’ factor can create unbalanced perceptions, both local and international, of the military mission. It may also lead to long-term dependency on military resources, rendering both military disengagement and follow on civilian activity more difficult. It is important to develop a culture of ownership and ‘self help’ within the local population. Any military activity carried out in the civil environment should use the minimum resources necessary to achieve the task. This approach will assist the JTFC in guarding against the inadvertent creation of this long-term dependency.

l. **Transition Management.** Tasks and activities to support the civil environment are often carried out in circumstances where there is inadequate infrastructure and widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Therefore, once committed, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be difficult as it may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, jeopardize security within the JOA, and could cause lasting damage to public confidence in the Joint Force. Before undertaking any tasks and activities and committing military resources, the commander should have a transition plan both for individual tasks and activities, and for the civil-military domain within his operations area as a whole. The transition plan should

⁴ JWP 3-80 ‘*Information Operations*’.

include resources that may be committed, key milestones, measures of effectiveness, and to whom and when responsibility will transfer.

CHAPTER 4 – CIMIC IN PRACTICE

SECTION I – APPLICATION OF CIMIC

401. **Command Direction.** Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) should ensure theatre-wide coherence in the conduct of CIMIC, and any resulting supporting activities or assistance to the civil component, in order to progress along the critical path to achieving the desired UK and international political objectives.

402. **An Integral Function.** CIMIC is a staff function that requires the support of trained specialists. It supports the commander's intent and main effort and should be an integral part of the estimate process and mission plan. It enables the planning and conduct of the military effort to take into account the aims, objectives and methods of those civil actors (and vice versa). The commander should therefore have the capacity within his headquarters to identify and analyse civil issues and influences, and have the necessary assets within his force to implement any resulting tasks and activities.

403. **Complexity.** The potential complexity of the CIMIC requirement should not be underestimated and is proportional to the number of actors involved. Each type of civil actor within the JOA is likely to operate in a different way, and have an individual mandate with its own aims and objectives. Identification of the key civil actors will be crucial to successful CIMIC and a wider understanding of the operational environment: those with capacity and capability, those with influence, and those with authority and responsibility.

404. **Adaptability.** The relative importance of those identified key civil actors and inter-relationships will not be constant throughout an operation. It will be a variable alongside those of the security situation, the geography, and the level of operation (including the primacy of the military mission). This will require the CIMIC profile to be managed and altered accordingly.

SECTION II – ORGANISATION

405. **Operations Focus.** As a potential force enabler, CIMIC should be properly resourced with staff of suitable seniority and quality to ensure that civil issues are fully taken into account at all levels, and relevant civil factors integrated into all plans. The size and specific organisation of the JTFC's CIMIC staff will vary depending on the specific mission and operational circumstances, as will the balance between core personnel and augmentees, drawn principally from the Civil Affairs Group.¹

¹ The Civil Affairs Group is due to be reconfigured and renamed the Joint CIMIC Group (Jt CIMIC Gp) in mid 2004.

406. **CIMIC in the Joint Headquarters.** There are different templates for the CIMIC focus (NATO for example has CIMIC as a stand-alone J9 function). However, in order to maintain a coherent approach to CIMIC throughout the levels of operation, and to achieve the necessary operational linkages, particularly with Information Operations, Media Operations, and Targeting, (reflecting UK CIMIC Policy²), the CIMIC process should be embedded within the J3 staff functions and should be conducted within the normal command chain. Whilst organic CIMIC staff may not be specialists, they should be trained and understand the principles of CIMIC and the complexities of the civil-military interface, including the workings of international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). A generic CIMIC cell is illustrated at Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1 - Generic CIMIC Cell

407. **Augmentation.** Although CIMIC is not a specialist function, depending on the type of operation and the degree of civil involvement, the Joint Task Force (JTF)

² UK CIMIC Policy D/JDCC/20/8/1 dated 6 February 2003.

may need to be augmented to maximise the potential for civil-military unity of effort. This augmentation may take the following form:

- a. **CIMIC Advisors.** Advisors, in the form of additional CIMIC trained staff officers from the Joint CIMIC Group (Jt CIMIC Gp), more familiar with the constraints, restraints and limitations of civil actors and with a more detailed understanding of their processes, to enhance the JTFC's CIMIC planning and management capability. They can also provide the JTFC's input to any civil-military planning effort.
- b. **CIMIC Team.** A team of (typically) four CIMIC specialists from the Jt CIMIC Gp, to conduct 'field' assessments of the civil environment, assist in the establishment of CIMIC Centres (see paragraph 421), and to identify, manage and/or supervise any military tasks and activities within the civil environment and the required resources to complete them – be they civil, military, or a combination of both.
- c. **Functional Specialists.** Whilst the Joint Force is not normally responsible for undertaking specialist civil functions, there may be instances where this is necessary, in the short-term, in order to meet Joint Force requirements or wider political-military objectives within the JOA, identified through the assessment process. These specialists, who need not be military, will provide expert advice and should be 'called-forward' when required to meet the specific needs of the specified task or activity.³
- d. **Liaison Officers.** Liaison officers (LOs) have the potential to significantly enhance understanding at the civil-military interface, facilitate more effective civil-military unity of effort and be crucial in the building of trust and respect between the Joint Force and key civil actors. It is important to establish a clear and robust liaison architecture (see paragraph 422), using LOs at every level of command. The requirement for LOs should be properly resourced if the necessary effect is to be achieved and potential realised. With an understanding of CIMIC principles and the organisation to which they are liaising, LOs should be selected carefully for their ability to relate to the civil environment and its varied characteristics. They may be drawn from the Jt CIMIC Gp, or from elsewhere within staffs when the necessary level of appreciation of CIMIC principles has been achieved.
- e. **Humanitarian Advisor.** Careful consideration should be given to the provision of Humanitarian Advisors seconded from the Department for International Development (DFID) to provide the JTF with specialist advice on

³ Functional specialists can be drawn from the Jt CIMIC Gp, but may also be drawn from the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps (V).

the effects of military action on the humanitarian sector and how these may best be mitigated, thereby enabling commanders to make a better informed military judgement. A humanitarian advisor will be a valuable conduit, providing links to humanitarian actors that may be 'off-limits' to the Joint Force because of the operational situation. This advice will have utility throughout the phases and levels of any operation and will complement the work undertaken by CIMIC staff and the Political Advisor (POLAD).

408. **Other Staff Functions.** The scope of CIMIC, and the tasks and activities identified as a result, is broad and not restricted to a single staff branch in the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Whilst focused on J3, CIMIC is not a 'standalone' function; rather its principles should be applied to the activities of all staff branches. All military activities will generate some impact on the civil environment and will therefore influence the effect the JTFC is trying to create. In order to mitigate the impact and maximise the effect close liaison between all branches involved in the civil environment will be necessary. However, it is important that CIMIC staff remain the focal point for civil-military matters to ensure functional coherence and that the JTFC has a true recognised civil-military picture on which to base his operational decision making. Figure 4.2, although not exhaustive, illustrates the key inter-branch links necessary to ensure coherence. A more detailed listing of inter-branch CIMIC considerations is at Annex 4A.




Figure 4.2 – CIMIC Applicability to Staff Branches

SECTION III – PLANNING

409. **Early Engagement.** Early engagement with and understanding of the civil environment is essential for successful CIMIC, which needs to be fully incorporated at the earliest possible stage in the operational planning and estimate process.

410. **Stakeholder Analysis.** There are significant actors that will influence the planning process directly, indirectly, or both. The CIMIC Estimate should include a stakeholder analysis. Such stakeholders may be:

- a. DFID.
- b. Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- c. UN Lead Agency, Resident Co-ordinator, Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or individual UN Agencies such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- d. Allied or coalition forces, e.g. US Civil-Military Operations Task Forces.
- e. Donor organisations such as European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and US Agency for International Development (USAID).
- f. Host Nation Security Forces.
- g. Host Nation National and Local Government.
- h. Major NGOs.
- i. IOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
- j. The Local Population.

411. **Country Assessments.** Sources of information for country assessments include the Internet, Defence Intelligence Staff, NGOs/IOs, the Jt CIMIC Gp, J2, and existing Joint Planning Guides. The country assessment should be carried out as thoroughly as time permits and from a regional perspective. The country assessment is the first stage of the CIMIC contribution to the estimate process. It should be carried out by the CIMIC staff ensuring that significant civil factors are considered in the overall planning process.

412. **Planning Considerations.** These are no different to overall military planning considerations. The CIMIC staff should understand Commanders' Intentions and any specific direction that has been given from higher authority such as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) Directives. The most important point to note is that CIMIC planning should not take place in isolation from other staff branches. Suggested CIMIC planning considerations are:

- a. Geography.
- b. Cultural Factors.
- c. Humanitarian Assistance.
- d. Funding.
- e. Civil Emergency Planning and Preparedness.
- f. Infrastructure.
- g. Public Affairs/Media Operations.
- h. Economics and Commerce.
- i. Civil Organisations.
- j. Civil Resources and Management.
- k. Legal aspects.

It is important that where possible the CIMIC staff develop an understanding of Civil Plans for the operational theatre, and again where possible achieve harmonisation with them, without breaching operations security.

413. **Funding.** Activity in support of the Commander's military mission, such as assistance to the local community that has a force protection objective, will be funded from the budget allocated for the operation. 'Additional' costs of other military activity, which supports humanitarian assistance or reconstruction, should normally be funded from elsewhere (e.g. DFID) and specific criteria for this will almost certainly apply. It is the responsibility of the CIVSEC/J8 staff to ensure a robust mechanism for the disbursement of and accounting for, funds from internal sources and external organisations, and this will require a close working relationship with both CIMIC staff and DFID (via the Humanitarian Adviser if assigned).

414. **Role of the Political Advisor.** The role of the POLAD is to give political advice to the commander - as he also deals with the civil environment it is important that the CIMIC staff have a clear understanding of their relationship with POLAD and

where the boundaries are in terms of responsibility and also where there are areas of overlap. In the latter case it must be absolutely clear who has the lead on issues where this overlap occurs.

415. **Legal Aspects.** Legal staff should have an input to CIMIC planning. Legal considerations include the domestic law of the nation in which operations are taking place, (which will affect customs, contracting, status of forces etc), International Law (e.g. the impact of the mandate, International Humanitarian Law), and own or coalition partners' domestic law (which may affect certain CIMIC activity).

SECTION IV – CIMIC IN PRACTICE

416. **Civil-Military Line of Operation.** CIMIC facilitates the development and execution of the civil-military line of operation, which defines military activity taking place in support of the civil environment. The civil-military line of operation should be considered at the outset of the campaign planning process, and should provide the full justification of each activity or group of activities, identify the resources involved, the implications of their use, and plans for extraction from the activities concerned. It should include plans for the handover of tasks to the civil sector and in turn including milestones towards that handover (transition management).

417. **Military Support to the Civil Environment.** Military support to the civilian environment is often grouped on the civil-military line of operation by function under headings such as administration, infrastructure, economy, humanitarian assistance or Security Sector Reform. Specialist advice and co-ordination will be required, facilitated by the CIMIC process. Activities include:

a. **Population and Resource Control.** Population and Resource Control provides security for the population, denies personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilises population and materiel resources, and reduces the effectiveness of enemy infiltration. Population controls include refugee/displaced person movement, curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, ration controls, amnesty programmes, and inspection of facilities.

b. **Humanitarian Assistance.** Humanitarian Assistance is defined (in UK) as 'support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian

tasks, responsibility should be handed-over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity.⁴ (see also 2A13.)

c. **Support to Civil Administration.** In the case of a failed or failing state there may be a requirement or obligation to ensure public order and safety and to ensure effective administration in the absence (temporary or otherwise) of a competent authority. In such circumstances the military may be required to support or substitute for the civil administration. This will place particular demands on the JTFC, and CIMIC staff should be prepared to advise the commander, in close co-ordination with the POLAD. This is an area where specialist advice may also be required. Subject to the specific requirements of the situation, a guiding principle will be the imperative to restore responsibility for civil administration to a legitimate interim or competent civil authority at the earliest opportunity.

d. **Support to the Civil Community.** Military activities or projects in direct support of the civil community should be agreed with the appropriate civil authority, and should reflect the civil-military line of operation. Activities should contribute to the creation of a more normal, and therefore secure environment, and can shape local perceptions. As a result, such activity may well generate a positive Force Protection spin-off. Activity may be characterised by the need to create an immediate effect, requiring rapid funding and resourcing (so-called Quick Impact Projects). As it is not guided solely by humanitarian principles,⁵ this activity should not be considered humanitarian in nature, but should where possible be co-ordinated with aid and development agencies, and should be conceived to provide benefit in the long term.

SECTION V – CIMIC PERSONNEL

417. When deployed, the JTFC employs three physical components to facilitate CIMIC:

- a. Trained CIMIC staff embedded within operational HQs.
- b. Trained CIMIC augmentees (CIMIC teams, liaison officers, functional specialists) (see also paragraph 407).
- c. All-arms force elements not organic to the CIMIC organisation.

418. The Jt CIMIC Gp will provide an operational capability to meet or augment this requirement and/or to train individually assigned personnel. Where force element

⁴ JWP 0-01.1 'United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions'.

⁵ Humanity, Impartiality (i.e. according to need alone) and Neutrality.

troops are required to conduct tasks developed from the civil-military line of operation (such as logistic support, population and resource control, medical and engineering support or humanitarian assistance), these activities should be conducted with direction from CIMIC staff on behalf of the commander in order that they reinforce broader objectives towards civil and military end states agreed during inter-agency planning. The Jt CIMIC Gp will provide CIMIC education and situation awareness to force elements.

419. **CIMIC Support to Commanders.** The responsibilities of CIMIC personnel include the following areas:

- a. Reduction of civilian interference with military operations (i.e. enhanced freedom of manoeuvre).
- b. Promotion of co-operation to achieve economy and unity of effort. This includes transition planning for handover of responsibilities.
- c. Development of the CIMIC components of operation plans and contingency plans.
- d. Advice to commanders of the civilian impact on military operations.
- e. Augmenting information on the political, cultural, and economic situation in the JOA, in close liaison with J2.
- f. Adding context to the J2 brief by identification of potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardise the military mission, and advice to commanders on those issues.
- g. Providing collateral for the intelligence cycle, where appropriate, through direct involvement with the civilian population.⁶
- h. Development of the Protected Target List: facilities that could be potential targets that could also affect post-conflict recovery, e.g. docks, airfields etc.
- i. Screening local population groups and providing a conduit for information of value from the local population.
- j. Identification, planning, and implementation of programmes to gain and maintain public understanding and good will, in support of the military mission

⁶ Note: CIMIC cannot be an active intelligence-gathering activity without risking the understanding and trust engendered through the process.

- k. Production of the CIMIC dimension to Information Operations (Info Ops).
- l. Development of measures of effectiveness to measure progress.
- m. Advice given to commanders on the employment of other military units that can conduct activities in support of the civil environment.
- n. Co-ordination with J1/J4 on the military use of civilian facilities and materiel.
- o. Assistance given to J1/J4 with the employment of local labour resources.
- p. Co-ordination with the Legal Advisor (LEGAD), concerning advice to commanders on rules of engagement for dealing with civilians in the area of operations.
- q. Consideration of the long-term effects of military activities and advising commanders and staffs of the consequences. This becomes most important when considering a transition and exit.

420. **Civil-Military Operations Centre.** CIMIC staff at the operational level may establish and operate a civil-military operations centre (CMOC) to interface and coordinate CIMIC activity with governmental agencies, IOs and NGOs. A centre with similar functions may also be established and run by civilian organisations,⁷ in which case the military plays a supporting role.

421. **CIMIC Centre.** Units may establish CIMIC Centres as a primary interface with the civilian population and civilian organisations in their area of responsibility. Unlike a CMOC, a CIMIC Centre is open to the public.

422. **Liaison Architecture.** The CIMIC liaison and co-ordination architecture must be flexible and tailored to the mission and the situation. It should provide appropriate guidance to formations and units at all levels and have clear areas of responsibility. Key CIMIC areas that specifically relate to liaison and co-ordination are highlighted below:

- a. Direct liaison to key civil bodies.
 - (1) Designated Lead Agency, or HC/RC/SRSG.
 - (2) Key IOs/NGOs.⁸

⁷ There are a number of expressions that have been used to describe such a centre: Humanitarian Operations Centre is one.

⁸ The command medical representative is valuable as a point of contact to liaise with healthcare organisations.

- (3) Key civil authorities.
 - (4) Key donors.
 - (5) Leading Agencies (see paragraph 2A6).
- b. Direct Liaison to HN.
 - c. Visibility over areas of mutual activity. To avoid duplication and maximise economy of effort.
 - d. Visibility of Civil Emergency Planning status and capabilities.
 - e. Identification of key capability gaps.
 - f. Credible and authoritative link to the Military.
 - g. Point of contact for requests for military support.
 - h. Military advice to key civil bodies.

423. **Quality and Capabilities of Liaison Officers.** LOs must be seen as a credible source of advice and need to be capable of taking decisions and providing advice at the appropriate level to the civil actor within the liaison architecture. LOs should be capable of collecting and assessing information so as to provide the Commander with an accurate and timely overall picture of a given situation or activity. They need to have the confidence of the Commander and be capable of effectively briefing senior staff and influencing the military planning/decision cycle. LOs to the key civil bodies should be both diplomatic and sensitive in their approach when dealing with the varied characteristics of the civil dimension. They must be proactive enough to provide advice and support to the civil bodies and community when required. They will be required to have an understanding of the aims and goals of the civil bodies, their capabilities and concerns, and to identify any sensitivities that could affect civil-military relations. LOs should be properly resourced in terms of communications equipment.

SECTION VI – MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND NORMALITY INDICATORS

424. In the intervention and transition phases of a military operation, military activity in the civil domain usually has a direct impact on the mission, and monitoring the effectiveness of that activity is an important function. The JTFC will require his own means to assess a situation, judge progress being made, and to inform his own CIMIC process. The collection of both military and non-military data is required to ensure that credible and reliable data is available to make informed decisions in

support of the campaign. The synergy of CIMIC, Info Ops and Media Ops will be particularly effective in the application of selected performance measurements. The local population can assist and support the collection of data, and informed of results once the data has been adequately processed. Positive results will be a boost to the morale of civil authorities and the population.

425. Two methods of measuring effectiveness are available:

a. **Measures of Effectiveness.** Measures of effectiveness (MOE) provide tools to measure the level of success of the mission, thereby assessing operational effectiveness in carrying out the mission and associated tasks. MOE do not measure the end result of an operation, (e.g. the condition and quality of life of dislocated civilians following humanitarian assistance), but the degree of success of military activity within the civil environment, thereby providing a means to correlate progress in achieving the overall mission with the effectiveness of that activity.

b. **Normality Indicators.** Normality indicators (NIs) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NIs measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically.

426. The force commander must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the Area of Responsibility, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. Direct and indirect MOE and NIs should be jointly developed with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil-military activities. It is the interface with the civilian sector that provides the means for collecting data that contributes to MOE and NIs. MOE and NIs should be SMART⁹ and objective and comparable from occasion to occasion; measuring just that which can be easily measured will give a false impression. Robust information management systems and support are required to deliver MOEs and NIs effectively.

⁹ Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results-oriented, Time-based (although examples may occur where it is unhelpful to have a time element).

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ANNEX 4A – INTER-BRANCH AND INTER-SERVICE CIMIC CONSIDERATIONS

4A1. Whilst CIMIC staff are the focus for and advisors to the Joint Task Force Commander and his staff on CIMIC matters, it is not a standalone function but an integral part of all Branch activity, i.e. almost everything undertaken by the Joint Force will have an effect and/or impact on the civil environment. This in turn may influence what and how operations are conducted. This table suggests possible two-way links that should be considered between Branches and the J3 Operations Support (Ops Sp) CIMIC focus. Although the emphasis may change most points are relevant to the operations across the spectrum of tension.

BRANCH	CIMIC LINKAGES
LEGAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advice on the legal responsibilities for civilians. • Advice on International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law and Human Rights Law. • Legal interpretation of Status of Forces Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding.
POLAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Also deals with the civil environment. CIMIC staff must have a clear understanding of the relationship with POLAD and where the boundaries of responsibility overlap; it must be clear who has the lead on issues where the overlap occurs.
J1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency burials of civilians (where necessary). • Liaison over real estate for Prisoner of War camps, and burial sites. • Terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians. • Identification and provision of specialist manpower (e.g. linguists).
J2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Input to development of Joint collection plans: J2 may use information derived from the CIMIC process. CIMIC staff have access to a wide range of personnel on the ground but the use of information so gleaned for operational purposes is a sensitive issue. • Requests for Information. • Input to Joint Operations Area (JOA) management and preparation. • Input and advice to Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Support Group.
J3 Current Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accounting for the effect of current operations on the civil environment, particularly the population. • Awareness of the effect of the civil environment on a Course of

BRANCH	CIMIC LINKAGES
	<p>Action (CoA).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of civil factors in JOA and route management. • Passage of CIMIC information to and from subordinate HQs.
J3 Current Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The consideration of both short and long term civil factors that will affect the Joint Campaign Plan. • Planning of tasks and activities within the civil environment where they become the main effort.
J3 Ops Sp Tgt/BDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target suitability and deconfliction, in conjunction with LEGAD. • Input to short and long-term gain/loss assessment. • Recce possibilities.
Info Ops/ PSYOPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure coherency and achieve synergy with Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). • Input to conduct of Info Ops/PSYOPS in the civil environment. • Feedback Measures of Effectiveness for Info Ops.
Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieve synergy and coherence with media activities affecting the civil environment. • Input to Media Ops with regard to the reporting of civ-mil matters.
Engrs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaison with Host nation (HN) on Engineer (Engr) matters. • Engr support to tasks and activities within the civil environment, including supervision of civil actors. • Impact of obstacle belts on the local population. • Impact of use of local resources/access to facilities. • Inclusion of civil factors in real estate management. • Specialist advice to CIMIC staff: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) awareness. Environmental Considerations. Infrastructure considerations. Technical Advice.
GEO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Battlefield Area Evaluation to reflect civil factors, for example; consideration of built up areas not only in terms of mobility but also in terms of what the population will do and the impact they would have on a mil action. • Assistance preparing CIMIC maps/products/overlays.
NBC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of sites (including research facilities) that present a potential Environmental Industrial Hazard (EIH). • Liaison with NBC Cell over the impact of an EIH threat on civil actors. • Assessing the NBCD capability of Civilian Population (CIVPOP) and facilities likely to be available for CIVPOP and UK forces for NBCD purposes.

BRANCH	CIMIC LINKAGES
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Location of water sources to be used for decontamination purposes.
J4 Log	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaison with HN police, emergency services and planning authorities. • Marking and policing of routes for military (main supply) or civilian use (e.g. refugee flow). • Host-nation support (HNS)/Civil-Military Resource Management. • Real Estate Management in the rear area. • Use of routes. • Accounting for the impact of the use of local resources on the population. • Customs duties as applicable. • Possible use of transportation and other resources where necessary to support CIMIC tasks. • Specialist Advice to J5 staff and CIVPOP where applicable.
Med/ Environmental Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of HNS. • Liaison over a wide range of civilian factors that will affect force protection including: • Medical Intelligence Assessments. CIMIC staff are an essential source of information on the local area on matters ranging from identifying local industry and the potential hazards it presents to recognising the signs and symptoms of and predicting the spread of endemic diseases. • Advising on the handling of the CIVPOP (from disease control to provision of water). • Offering advice and expertise to CIMIC staff/non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the CIVPOP where appropriate.
ES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible support to vehicle recovery and route clearance to maintain Freedom of Movement.
J5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integration of CIMIC into long term plans, e.g. post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.
J6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Listening – gathering of information on CIMIC activities. • Balancing the need to communicate with civilian agencies versus OPSEC requirements – Advising CIMIC staff.
J7	Training and theatre orientation of newly arrived CIMIC staff.
J8	<p>Deployment of Civil Secretary (Civ Sec) for the following functions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The co-ordination of financial matters for the force elements and between them and the host nation. • The co-ordination of the production and control of contracts with the host nation.

4A2. Although the Land environment is that in which CIMIC is most applicable, CIMIC considerations in other environments include:

ENVIRONMENT	CIMIC LINKAGES
Maritime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIMIC activity in context of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations. • Port and Harbour Control (in conjunction with 17 Port and Maritime Regt.). • Management of Sea Ports of Disembarkation. • Coastal issues. • Environmental considerations.
Air	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIMIC considerations apply at Deployment Operating Bases, Forward Operating Bases, and Air Ports of Debarkation. • Military may be required to manage airports and airspace, particularly in cases of failed or failing states.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Note: Where a definition is sourced from an authority, such as NATO, this is shown in the bracketed reference following each definition. When no additional reference is made then it should be taken that this reflects a common understanding of the meaning or is common usage.

CIMIC (UK)

UK CIMIC is the process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives. (IJWP 3-90)

CIMIC (NATO)

NATO CIMIC is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (AJP-9)

CIMIC Centre

The primary interface at the tactical level with the civilian population and civilian organisations. The CIMIC centre would normally be open to the public, and manned by a CIMIC team. (IJWP 3-90)

CIMIC Team

A team of (usually) 4 CIMIC personnel from the Joint CIMIC Group supporting the command by conducting field assessments of the civil environment; managing CIMIC centres; and planning and supervising military support to the civil environment, such as Quick Impact Projects. (IJWP 3-90)

Civil Affairs

Those activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities. (US definition JP1-02)

Civil Affairs Group (UK)

A manpower resource of CIMIC trained regular and reserve staff who are available to augment deployed headquarters with CIMIC advisors, and provide CIMIC practitioners at the tactical level (see CIMIC Team above).¹ (IJWP 3-90)

¹ The CA Group is due to be restructured, and renamed the Joint CIMIC Group, with initial operational capability mid 2004 and having tri-service representation.

Civil-Military Operations

Planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population. (US definition JP1-02)

Civil-Military Co-ordination

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. (UN OCHA Guidelines dated March 2003)

Civil-Military Operations Centre

The operational level interface with governmental agencies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations. Facility may be established either by military or civilian component to enable co-ordination of plans, and may come under a variety names. (IJWP 3-90)

Complex Emergency

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme. (UN Inter Agency Standing Committee definition)

Host-Nation Support. Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory. (AAP-6)

Humanitarian Assistance (NATO)

Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility should be handed-over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. (JWP 0-01.1)

Humanitarian Assistance (UN)

Aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. (UN OCHA Guidelines dated March 2003)

Humanitarian Co-ordinator

The country-director of the nominated lead agency whose primary function is to facilitate and ensure the quick, effective, and well co-ordinated provision of humanitarian assistance. (OCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies)

Humanitarian Distance

The distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors and that of the military. (UN OCHA Guidelines March 2003)

Humanitarian Space

The establishment and maintenance by humanitarian agencies and organisations when they deploy of a conducive humanitarian operating environment. (UN OCHA Guidelines dated March 2003)

Humanity

Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. (UN General Assembly resolution 46/182)

Impartiality

Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of suffering must be guided solely by needs, and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress. (UN General Assembly resolution 46/182)

Influence Activity

Influence Activity comprises any activity whose primary purpose is to influence will, and is achieved by the promotion of identified themes to target audiences through messages. Influence Activity seeks to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce target audiences to adopt a particular Course of Action or to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a desired Course of Action. (JWP 0-01.1)

Internally Displaced Person

A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (AAP-6)

International Organisation

An organisation established by intergovernmental agreement and operating at the international level. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a unique status in that it was not established by intergovernmental agreement and is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation.

Joint CIMIC Group

See Civil Affairs Group (above).

Lead Agency

A lead agency may be designated to take the lead in policy making, planning and information sharing, and acting as the main point of contact for other UN agencies, the military and political components, non-governmental organisations, and for the parties to the conflict. The lead agency may also allocate tasks and co-ordinate activity, but it does not have any command responsibility or overall authority. (UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations)

Neutrality

Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. (UN General Assembly resolution 46/182)

Non-governmental Organisation

A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission.

Refugee

Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (AAP-6)

Quick Impact Projects

Activity undertaken by the military within the civil environment, in support of the mission. Quick Impact Projects are characterised by the need to create an immediate effect, they can shape local perceptions, and they should contribute to the achievement of a more secure environment. (IJWP 3-90)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
CA	Civil Affairs (US)
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVPOP	Civilian Population
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CMCoord	Civil-Military Co-ordination (UN)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations (US)
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
EIH	Environmental Industrial Hazard
Engr	Engineer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ES	Engineering Support
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GEO	Geographic
HC	Humanitarian Co-ordinator
HDRO	Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
HN	Host nation
HNS	Host-nation support
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IJWP	Interim Joint Warfare Publication
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JOA	Joint Operations Area
Jt CIMIC Gp	Joint CIMIC Group
JTF	Joint Task Force

JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
Log	Logistics
LO	Liaison officer
Med	Medical
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Measure of effectiveness
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NI	Normality indicator
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OGD	Other government department
Ops Sp	Operations Support
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POC	Point of contact
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRC	Population and Resource Control
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QIP	Quick Impact Project
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results-oriented, Time-based
SPOD	Sea Port of Disembarkation
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

MILITARY PUBLICATIONS

AJP-9 '*NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine*'.

ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook.

JWP 0-10 '*United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations*'.¹

JWP 3-50 '*Peace Support Operations*'.

JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.

JWP 3-52 '*Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations*'.

JWP 3-80 '*Information Operations*'.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations.

UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies.

'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies'.

SPHERE Project '*Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*'.

ICRC Code of Conduct.

¹ JWP 0-01 is due to be replaced by JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' in April 2004.

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